

The warning capability of airborne (U2) flights was never utilized except in a very limited capacity. Any system of warning whether it is COMINT, Embassy personnel, agents, attaches, military liaison missions, etc., depends for success on frequency of observation, intercept, or interrogation to permit comparisons. U2 flights were so restricted that comparative cover over many critical areas and installations was never obtained. Some areas were seen only in 1956 and never again. Other areas were never covered. In our opinion, the Community has in being, in the U2 capability, a direct, explicit, and dependable source of warning. If periodic coverage is continuously obtained, many problems concerning the Community regarding ICBM-IRBM, CBR, LRA, sub activity and buildups, etc. would be greatly lessened. However, the capability now exists and needs only the decision to use it.

It would be difficult and wordy to cite all the instances where U2 photography has warned the Community of Soviet capabilities and even possible intentions. The simplest way of accomplishing such an estimate would be to mentally extract all intelligence now possessed by the Community resulting from U2 overflights, and then evaluate the intelligence picture and the value of U2 overflights.

Regardless of what warning system(s) is utilized, periodicity is an all important factor. Should the DEW line be restricted to operating one week out of six, should COMINT be utilized only the first week in July and January, or should MIDAS achieve only limited coverage or be restricted to one month's operation in twelve, the results would be far

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from satisfactory. Likewise, airborne or satellite-borne reconnaissance, regardless of resolution or ground object size analytical capability, must provide for frequent, repetitive, comparative cover.

As stated in the Warning Survey Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations, it is dangerous for the Community to rely so heavily on a single source--COMINT, particularly "since the productivity of that source is in the last analysis under Soviet control". It would be almost as dangerous to rely solely on airborne and satellite-borne reconnaissance even though such a source is not under Soviet control. However, all productive sources should be fully exploited and their readout coordinated. Satellite and airborne photography should receive the same emphasis and full-time utilization and exploitation as other productive sources. The productivity of any other source of intelligence, e.g., COMINT, might be imagined had it operated the same number of days as the U2 over a period of five years:

1956 - 5 days	(5 missions)
1957 - 13 days	(13 missions)
1958 - 1 day	(1 mission)
1959 - 3 days	(3 missions)
1960 - 2 days	(2 missions)

This gives a total of 24 days operation out of a possible 1672 from 4 July 1956 to 1 February 1961. What would the productivity of any other source have been had it operated only 24 days out of 1672 days?

The U2 today, particularly with an improved engine and capability of unmanned flight, offers a superb intelligence collection system for warning as well as strategic intelligence. Some time will pass before a satellite-borne system approaches the present U2 capability for strategic, let alone warning intelligence. As stated by the Warning Survey Summary

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"the lack of a direct source of warning has forced the development of indirect and inferential techniques". Are indirect and inferential techniques to suffice, with a more accurate and precise system left on the bench?



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